WGS 186 Generic Algorithm Inero ML LECLURE. Discriminant model vs. Generative model. GAN, Tronsformer... ↓ Sv M, ... Generic Algorithm -> An Optimization Alyorithm Naire Bayes. V Bayesion Network Assume some conditional dependence among some parameter as a necrok U Bayesian US. Frequentise, difference view of probability. some ground truth. para + Incucion Intertion prior belief. Data + ground touth.

Linear Regression • generative model independent (explanators variable). $V_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} X_{i} + \Sigma_{i}$ $y_{i} = \hat{\beta}_{0} + \hat{\beta}_{i} \times_{i} + \hat{\xi}_{i}$ $P = \frac{1}{12} \qquad N(0, 6^{2})$ $P = \frac{1}{12} \qquad N(0, 6^{2})$ Gaussian Distr. butin true Value linear regression $\hat{Y}_i = \hat{\beta}_o + \hat{\beta}_i X_i$ Perceptron -1 objective estimated function. Value no random variation Quantifying error / cost - the "goodness" of the line. -Ý; = Bo + B, X: > Distance. $\frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{y} - \frac{1}{y} \right] - \gamma Absolute loss$ $= \sum_{i=1}^{n} |(m \times_{i} + b) - 4_{i}|$ which parameters result in Ionese "cost"/error. $\cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2} \right)^2 \right) \xrightarrow{-7} sum of squarch error.$ V ∑ 55 Ē: lease square objective function. plane $\begin{pmatrix} & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & &$ $X_{2} : \beta_{i} \times_{i} + \beta_{o}$ -> clata points. ×2 1 a function of the 1 x2 + 13, X, + 13 = 0 I multiple features. J

extend risk surface (Minimize) Ko+ K, X, + · - + Kn Xn = 0 $\langle I \rangle$ A hyper-plane. risk risk surface J K, boul shape b/c quadratic ; > minimum function. To find minimum, one way is & find herinchice and set to O $SS_{\overline{E}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (Y_i - B_p - B_i X_i)^2$ $2\sum_{i=1}^{n} (B_0 + B_i n_i - \theta_i) = 0$ $\frac{2}{2}\frac{SSE}{B_{B_{a}}} = \frac{2}{4}\frac{2}{B_{b}}\frac{2}{E}(Y_{i} - B_{a} - B_{i}X_{i})^{2}$ $=) n \beta_0 + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{2} \lambda_i - \sum_{i=1}^{2} y_i = 0$ $n\beta_0 + \beta_1 n\bar{\chi} - n\bar{y} = 0$ $= \sum_{i=1}^{n} 2(y_i - y_o - y_i x_i)(-1)$ Bo+B, X - y = 0 Bo= y - B, R $\frac{2}{\beta} \frac{35E}{\beta} = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{1}{\Sigma} \left(\frac{y_{i}}{\beta} - \frac{y_{o}}{\beta} - \frac{y_{i}}{\beta} \frac{x_{i}}{\beta} \right)^{2}$ シ $2 \Sigma (Y_{i} - B_{o} - B_{i} \varkappa_{i}) (- \varkappa_{i}) = 0$ $= \hat{Z} + (Y, -B_0 - B, \lambda,)(-\lambda;)$ $\overline{Z}(B_0+B_ix_i-Y_i)(x_i)=0$ $\overline{2} \beta_0 \varkappa_i + \overline{2} \beta_i \varkappa_i^2 - \overline{2} \varkappa_i \vartheta_i = 0$ nBox + nB, x2 - nx 7 =0 (y-1, n) n $= \sum \left(\begin{array}{c} \underline{\lambda}_{i} \\ \underline{\lambda}_{i} \end{array} \right) = \frac{\overline{\Sigma} \left(\begin{array}{c} \underline{\lambda}_{i} \\ -\overline{\lambda}_{i} \end{array} \right) \left(\begin{array}{c} \underline{4}_{i} \\ -\overline{4}_{i} \end{array} \right)}{\overline{\Sigma} \left(\begin{array}{c} \underline{\lambda}_{i} \\ -\overline{\lambda}_{i} \end{array} \right)^{2}} = \frac{C_{ov} \left(\begin{array}{c} \underline{\lambda}_{i} \\ V_{or}(n) \end{array} \right)}{V_{or}(n)}$ closed-form) Bo = <u>Y</u> - K, <u>n</u>

Perceptron Algorithm Classification yooblem Decision Boundary (perceptron) () 10 0 3 $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta X_2 = 0$ What line is best? linear regression 20 U Objective function <0 ψ ٢, if (P1, P2) on the optimization problem lines $H(n) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 n_1 + \beta_2 n_2 = 0.$ V Which side of the plane 6 0⁺¹ classification! $\beta_0 \neq \beta, \chi_1 \neq \beta_2 \chi_2 = 0$ Sign $(B_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{d} B_i X_i)$ label ti or sign function : +1 ß $X_1 \underline{B_1}$ sign, output Z K3 -1 Хļ $\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ \times_{3} \\ \times_{4} \\ \times_{5} \end{array}$ Acceleration function. Neuron



in heep learning, a convoluted neural networks 2 00 50, linear sequating hyper-planes: The Model: $\begin{array}{c}
 The Model: \\
 \vec{y} = M(n) \\
 \vec{y} = \hat{\beta} \times^{T} \\
 \vec{y} = \hat{\beta} (\hat{\beta}_{0} + (\hat{\beta}_{1}, \cdots, \hat{\beta}_{d}) \times^{T})
\end{array}$ $\frac{\beta_0}{\beta_0} + \frac{\Sigma}{\Sigma} \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1}; x_1 = 0$ $\begin{array}{c} y_{2} \\ y_{2} \\ y_{3} \\ y_{4} \\ y_{2} \\ y_{2} \\ y_{3} \\$ i + if A > 0 $i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A > 0 \\ 0 & \text{thermise} \end{cases}$ $B_0 \neq \sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal{A}} B_i a_i < 0$ Decision boundary $\frac{1}{\hat{\beta}_{o}} + (\hat{\beta}_{1}, \dots, \hat{\beta}_{d}) \times^{T} = 0$ Kosenblaters Perceptron Learning Algorithm · Starts with a random hyperplane (Bo, B. "Bd) · Incremencelly modify the hyperplane such that points that are misclassified move closer to the correct side. Gradient Vescent Optimization Algorithm. Honever, ve can use generic algorithm for optimizartion.

convex function Optimization for perceptron always have one global minimum. Gradiene Descene: ho- far $\stackrel{B_{o} + F_{i}, X_{i}}{}$ + $\stackrel{F_{a} \times 2}{} = 0$ is each point y true y prediced. from 0 B $loss = \sum_{i=1}^{n} - Y_{i} \cdot (F_{o} + B, X_{i} + F_{a} \times 2)$ J(To maximize F. $1 \qquad \chi = \chi_0 + \alpha \frac{dF}{dx} (\chi_0)$ minimize Using Gradient descent. To minimize F $\kappa = \kappa_o - \alpha \frac{dF}{dn}(\kappa_o)$ $\frac{\partial P}{\partial B_0} = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial}{\partial B_0} \left(Y_i \left(B_0 + B_1 X_1 + B_2 X_2 \right) \right)$ $= - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \forall_i$ 1 guarantee a global min for 1 convex function. $\frac{\partial D}{\partial B_{i}} = - \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{i} \times_{ii}$ More generally, we have the following derivative: $\frac{\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{D}(\widehat{\beta}_{o},\cdots,\widehat{\beta}_{d})}{\widehat{\mathcal{Z}}\widehat{\beta}_{j}} = -\sum_{i\in \Lambda} \mathcal{Y}_{i}\mathcal{X}_{ij} \qquad j=1,\cdots,d.$ In gradient descent, we are updating: no summation b/c we are doing each point individually Ĵ

Batch Perception: While some (ri, 9;) mis dassifieh: for i from 0 to n: $w = w + d(Y_i, \kappa_i)$ If points are linealy seperable VV perceptron learning with gradient descent guarantee to find the line there seperates all points. Optimization Convex シ if we add constraints \in Constraints GD studes in local min. β. B. non-convex with local min Non-gradient Descent ("Hill-climbing"). iden D: jumps to neighboring places. if it is lower than previous, keep going. if it is higher, continue jumpinz. until finding the minimum.

idea 2): Éxploration phase Exploration Exploitation VS. U diction. Temperature. J high exploring mindsee explore at first, meaning high probability to take bad move. And lower exploration later on. V (cooling) Simulated Annealing · Choose a number of "Steps" (iterations). · For each step · Randomly introduces a perturbation (a small change to the current Combination) · Always accept the new alternative if it reduces the cost. · Kondomly accept some alternatives that increases the cost (uphill change). · Slow 12 becrease the uphill acceptance probability · later step are less likely to accept bad perturbations. Xε Xeti = XetD (in the second s $if f(X_{\epsilon_{\tau}}) < f(X_{\epsilon}),$ $X \in = X_{E+1}$ else "Leoling" temperature p= 1- e-lemp L Convergence of simulated annealing. hill climbing X = = Xer, with p probability. else Xt = Xt Cost at final temp. of iterations ¥

Problem of GD. Not all curves are continuous en) Traveling Salesman Problem (Discrete Curve). en) Four color in n by n checkboard. No same color is touching each other. Cost is the number of color couching each other. (Discrete (4.4) learning via optimization / no komain knowledge. Generic Algorithm (Biology 1000) can be used to "generate" objects by using them to figure out the L rule that makes the object. Biology \int (Evolution. > -> Darnin -> Natural Selection. · Exponential growth in population · Need) > Nor all member survive. member survive is not random. Which · Noc two member are alike. Mose variation are inhericeh. · Limited Resources. ψ Not every one will sorvive or reproduce. 0.12 the best suitced member will survive. · Mutation. · Population evolve, nor individuals. · Evolution is continuous. · Gene contric view of the evolution

l Hamilton's Kule R·B > c gene relatedness R, times the benefit to the group, B I larger than the cost to the individual human's behavior is the individual will demostrate altruistic behavior 1 more complex. Cindividual satisfy their own benefic to save others) Evolutionary How things evolve? Psychology 1 1. Natural selection Genotype -> Phenotype · sexual · group/kin (yene) (appearance). 1. language instirct. Genetic Algorithm (Evolutionary Algorithm) Generic programming 7 GATCCATACC... (generic algorithm) as an instruction code molecules old earth environment) amino acid RNA (property of copying itself) <u>CIHNOP</u> 99.9% accuracy Virus Prokaryotic Bateria One replicator molecules RNA -> UNA -> Virus -> Prokayotic) Eukayrotic Hat/plant C ... C Bacteria 2

AGCTAG into something better fit arrange ··· optimize code =) (Generic Alyorichm: AGTC _ _ _ -1/ such that Survival reproducción (AGTG...) . start with whole bunch of (> prob fitness / survival etis is high random solution · keep the base one (natural selection) · produce their mutated ones en) in perception bunch of random plane · repeat the process over many generations [10, 13, ··· 136] [0.1, -2.1...0.9] -> random plane 3 is the best -> give the least mistake. Firness function (plane) \checkmark mutate with parameters (with constraints) classification accuracy en) mutate 1~10% of "genes" on the training set (plane) hy 1~10% J mutate & crossover the best member of the population. idea. $f(x, y, z) = x^{2} + \sin^{2} x - \tan(x) + e^{-2y}$ find (2, Y, Z) that minimizes/maximizes initial population: random values of (x, 4, Z). $\begin{pmatrix} (1, 2.5, -3.5) \\ (0,5, 2.9, 4.9) \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{\text{evaluate at } f(\cdot)}$ $\begin{array}{c} \text{evaluate at } f(\cdot) \\ \text{fitness } & \text{of individual} \end{array}$ (0,000 77

select 1,000 "fittest" members \mathbf{U} recreate next generation of 10,000 repeat using mutation, cross over, breeding of the 1,000 "fitepst" members. generation 1 $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_{i} = [X_{i}, X_{i}, X_{i}, \dots, X_{i}]^{2}$ = $f(x_{ro}) f(x_{ri}) f(x_{re}) f(x_{rp})$ X = genotype selecced f(x) = phenotype. fittest individual bese in dividual members mutation Crossover · Evolution is not random : · Keproduction is key to generic algorithm for optimization. perception classification problems Start with P 1. Inicialize 1000 random planes Parameters : 2. Evaluate the value of the fitness P= population size function for each one of these planer E = elite size 3. Rank these planes by the most to MI = nutation rates, how many elements least fit" C = crossover type 4. Perform the crossover and mutation on Fitness function the top 100. T = selection type G = generations most fie Rosenblace's = ZIY.(BX)] ploe

(24) Most fit Generic algorithm: 2.7 -1.3 2.0 3.1 2.5 7.1 1.3 -0.5 7.0 3.1 2.0 8.0 is good for solving problems I when they are way too many potential solutions Mutate by 1 . 2.8 -1.2 2.1 3.2 2.6 7.2 Crossover: 2.7 -1.3 2.0 31 2.0 7.1 1 1.3 - 0.5 7.0 3.1 2.5 8.0 1 Neural Network + GA (Neuro evolution): B, Bor P neurons learning B, Bor P neurons learning B, Bor P neurons firing. Instinct = recognition idea of hidden layers in perception classification problem: mechanism on difference planes. Traveling Salesman Problem : shortest path to go through all the cities one time. · start with random tours · reproduce from the fictest members · crossing over

· Selection Criteria : GA will likely · pioportionate (roule=te wheel selection) proserve section of Chromasome. tournament selection · Elicism. > солсерь Schema Theorem Genes ~> learned biological concept function GA ~> learning concepts. Fitness of all in hividuals -> in nature nobeling survivel probability. ranking 1 - - -<u>1</u> · · · Survival Survival probability probability fieness Fitness Selection Mechods of GA: rankom O Generate initial population -- heuristics (rough approx, way of getting a solution).

(2) Evaluace every individual fitness (3) Kank individuals based on the fitness @ selece some individuals for reproduction & survive. secting: A = 15 -) Ranking based -> select each individual with probability. B = 10 $A = \frac{15}{15} \text{ prob.}$ $B = \frac{10}{15} \text{ prob.}$ $P_i \propto \frac{1}{\text{rank of ish}}$ 6 = 8 b = 5 E=3 F=2 G = 1 $busob \longrightarrow A = \frac{15}{45} prob.$ $prob = \frac{f}{\overline{\Sigma}_{12}}, f_{12}$ > Proportion H = 1total = 45. with replacement -) Tournament based _____ select subset of individual and complete. $D = \frac{5}{5+5}$ complete $\overline{E} = \frac{3}{5+3}$ L) Elite based -> selece the top Nth. individual rank based. elice based pro6. of 1 selecting prob individuals fieness of fitness the top proportion basek. prob. fiends

-> en) (3) Mutate some in Gividuals [0|, |0|, |1|] = -2|1|0|0|1|1|0](6) Crossover some individuals. each bie has 1% of mucacion. en) swap bits $\left[\frac{A|B|c|D|E}{A|D|c|B|E}\right]$ (n) single point ordered crossover ABCPEF ABCDKL dis advantage : V GHIJKL GHIJEF distant elements got broken up. Pr) double point crossour 1 Schemon Theorem: ABIJEF pattern GHCDKL "learned concept" cr) ex) average crossover pattern 3 fixed 12 13 |_| · - -T I average ① 1 * 1 * 0 2 varies 20 10 5 enj unordera crossover 10101 all fillows the 11100 A B C D E F G ABJKEFN patter / schenc. 10110 HIJLLMM HICDLMG · Order of Schema (+) Conscrainzeh crossover such as crossover in travelling sales men problem. $O(H_1) = 3$. # of fixed bits · Defining length of a schema. f(1+) = average fitness of population member that contain It. $L(H_1) = 5 - 1 = 4.$ location of last fixed bit - location of first fixed bit M(H,t) = # of members in the population that contains It at generation t. | is good if $f(H) > \frac{\sum f_i}{n} \in average fitness of the entire population.$

Using proportional selection, where the probability of ith member getting selected is $\frac{f_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{2} f_i}$ * of member with It schema that will get selected is 1 1 1 $\mathcal{K} \quad o_{T} \quad \text{incluse}$ $M(h, t+1) = M(h, t) \cdot \frac{f(H)}{\overline{f}}$ $\tilde{\chi} \quad \text{average} \quad \text{of} \quad \text{all}$ $if f(H) > \overline{f}, then \frac{f(H)}{\overline{f}} > 1,$ M(H, t+1) > M(H, t)

Game Theory · Social interaction games · Prisoner's Dilemma. -> Both yeople got caught. Other person get interrogated seperately Stay quiec Confess You quiee -1, -1 -12,0 confess 0,-12 [-8,-8] [Nash Equilibrium (If everyone is making a choice that is optimal given everyonc else's choice stays V the same) best strategy is confessing regardless what other choose. IJ prisoner logical induce to the resule that both will confess dilemma Opponenc A 13 en) en) Loke, Pepsi C left 2,3 1,4 Donie advertise A dvereise You 3,3 midde 4,1 DUNE 500, 500 1000 5 Advertise right -1, 9 2, 8 5,1000 Advertise · opponent will never take C B is better over all than C. er) Kabbiz Veer · you will never take right as 0,2 middle is better 5,5 Peer "rabbit hunting day · Nash Equilibrium 1,1 Rabbie 2,0

beer = 10/65, Rabbic = 1/6, 2 rabbits, 1 deer

· Contract Theory -> constraint

· Nash equilibrium shifted due to constraint

Nash equilibrium tells you how Сх). Stay Home Go Out others will play 1 01 Stay 1 5,5 2,8 how others will keep a behavior Home without any enforcement 1 0,0 Go 8,2 1 OUt C21) Dive Right Dive Lefe No Noch Equilibricem. kich right 0,0 -1,1 => Random V2 right, V2 lofe kick left 1, -1 0,0 2 С 1) 3,-3 => (mixed strategy nash equilibrium) A -2,2 V 0 -1,1 assume player B can choose either 0,0 B C or D with equal chance reward for player B is same if they pick C Assume player O pick or if they pick D. A with prob p, pick B with prob. 1-p. Dexpected reward for picking (is PA(-3) + (1-PA)(1) = - 4 PA +1 reward for D is PA(2)+(1-PA)(0) = 2 PA

· Pick PA such that Reward C & Reward D are same. So, PA(-3) + (1-PA) = PA(2) + O $1 - 4P_{A} = 2P_{A}$ PA = 16 \Downarrow Player 1 picks A with prob. 1/6, there is no strategy that player 2 can pick that increases the remark. , Overtime, player 1 will pick A with 16 · Do the same for player 2. player 2 will pick C with 1/3, remark for $A = P_{c}(3) + (1 - P_{c})(-2)$ remark for $B = P_{c}(-1) + (1 - P_{c})(0)$ $I = P_{c}(-1) + (1 - P_{c})(0)$ $5_{0}, 3_{P_{c}} - 2 + 2_{P_{c}} = -P_{c}$, waximizing the reward given that we don't know the opponent. $P_{c} = \frac{1}{3}$ B maximize points keep quiet confess 1. Given all the poential actions of my opponents, I pick my best move. keep quiec 20,20 0,21 (F) 2. If my opponenes know equilibrium what I am going to be, confess 21,0 5.5 they still carre hurt me. Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma Strategy tip for tac -> holding grude (keep quiet, than corfess

Keview of concepes: N.E. if everyone is picking their best B Strategy M best 12 stracedd 1, 4 C fwr A. 7, 3 L 13, 3 U Ð M 4, I 6, 2 D -1, 9 8,-1 2, 8 1 best strategy for A en) Two Nash Tzquilibrium. en) No Nash Equilibrium. R K L 2 4,6 U 59,9 6,8 U 4,7 0 6,5 $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} 7 \\ 7 \\ 8 \end{array} \right\}$ D 7,6 3, 7 Battle of the Sexes Þ · people stick nich the plan the other Boxing Musical made. Boxing 2,1 0,0 M IM usical O, D 1, 2 3 L K L 0,0 -1,+) · Assume prob p and I-p. G 12 -1, tı 0,0 expected remark for & picking L if G pick L with P and K with I-P.

ſ = (0)(p) + (1)(1-p)= 1-1 ER for K = (1)(P) + (0)(1-P)=) I=R for L = ER for K = P 1 - r = r $p = \frac{1}{2}$ er) LK mixed up picking strategy with probability. -3,3 -2,2 U U) genetic evolution! p -1, 1 0, 0 run genetic algorithm that calculates evolving probability. V approach global min/max equilibrium evolutionary stable strategy. J Self-enforcable · change the scale in the grid to approach some nash equilibrium for manipulation. en) U D U -3, -3 1, -1 · everyone is play D. " Net gain in the population if one choose U. D -1,1 0,0 {Dove - Hank Game } · If only Doves, Hawk gees 2 points, H D Poues gets 1 or Opoints 17 -1/4, -1/4 2,0 · If only Hawle, Hawk gets -1/4 points Pours get D pt. D 0,2 1,1

Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). " In a population of a species, what will be the proportion of these strategy. · With what probability will a species member will alitize one strategy over the other. Difference stratego (behavior) Bully Vore precent to be hank Assessor: assess each other and play roles as needed. · Indicators of fitness - Female choose and male compete. · Conspicuous consumption - wasteful behavior to show indicator of fitness to (Biological Behavior). be competitive. e») [1 D What is EES? · Expersed payoffs for the Vove and Hawk have to be same. H 0,0 3, 1 · Suppose II with 6 ۱, ۱ $D = \frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{2}$ D with 1 $expected(1-1) = (0)(6) + (1-6)(\frac{3}{2})$ similar to Mixed strategy nash equilibrium $e_{xpected}(1) = (\frac{1}{2})(6) + (1-6)(1)$ expected 14 = expected D $\frac{3}{1} - \frac{3}{1}6 = \frac{1}{2}6 + 1 - 6$ $6 = \frac{1}{\lambda}$

Parcicle Swarm Optimization (PSO) find the heighest peak. Pireztional velocities iaca; \bigcap , • Move in the direction of e personal bese global base individual descent)-> start with one point gradient randrons or previously chosen direction simulated -> population spread across the func. algorithm genetic mutate, crossover, reproduce. population fixed. GBEST can change at every iteration. advantage of idea: GBEST t individual Lan communicate with each other to share their information Vit X velocity of ith individual at the tth step Xi^E is the location of the ith person at the tth iteration. => $\int X_i^{t+1} = X_i^{t} + V_i^{t}$. , Guanater to converge Vit+1) I J memory of better position. global min? · How to update Vitt ? Vitt = Q Vit + B (personal best direction) local min ? + Y (global best direction). a is the most exploring variable. · Decrease the value of a every ineration. 1

derrease exploration minhsee (pretty much like simulated annealing). Knapsack problem - dynamic programminz. minimize risk & maximize reward. · B = randomness = r, c, where r, is a random # between 0 f 1 · Y = randomness = r2 62 ... $S_{o}, V_{i}^{t+1} = \alpha V_{i}^{t} + r_{i} c_{i} (P_{i}^{t} - X_{i}^{t}) + r_{2} c_{2} (G_{i}^{t} - X_{i}^{t})$ decrease with t (0, c,) direction of random # T personal best (0, c₂). global best. $X_{i}^{\epsilon+1} = X_{i}^{\epsilon} + V_{i}^{\epsilon_{T1}}$. - - - $7x^{4} - 8y^{4} + 3x^{3}y - \cdots + 17$ Objective function: Optimize the function. · Calculus - derivative / gradient - solve def = 0 df = 0 gradient descent - $X_{t+1} = X_t + d \frac{\lambda f}{\lambda x}(x_t)$ $Y_{err} = Y_e + \alpha \frac{\lambda f}{\lambda r} (Y_e)$ (Ax+BY+C) + for some A, B, C \mathbf{U}

(A×,+B×2+C×5+···+Z×26) 2 37 peaks on a 27 dimensional surface.

Seach space is massive! grahient descene not efficient highly non-convex. · Genetic Algorithm)-> population based! individual communicate ! · 1°50 V convege in search space. implementation. Class particle. position (X, , X2, ··· , XA) Velocity (V, V1, -, V4) (urrent fitness f(X, X, ..., Xd) bese_position (×b,, ×b,, ···, ×bd) best-firmess (f(best yosizion)) Class particle swarm: start random particles start random particles give them random initial velocity. -> compute everyoners fitness compute everyone's new position ie. X+1 = X++ Vz uphate the velocity, w=0.99w "No Free Lunch Theorem" - No single optimization algorithm will be better all the rest. then $V_{t+1} = WV_t + r, c, (Pbest; - x; t) + r_2 c_2 (Global - x; t)$ eventually go to 0. only these the direction exists and will converge => one joosition.

In PSO, No Crossover compared to genetic algorizhm. No Mutation Selection No 150 does not guarantee global minimum/maximum. Variation of PSO algorithm: Firefly Algorithm: iden: more than one particle will influence the the other. Velocity o f iden: best comparel to PSO, · Brightness of each firefly is the "Fitness". · Fire flies are attracted to brightness of other fireflies. For each fire fly ; For each firefly j if ith brightness < jth brightness: move $\frac{(X_j - X_i)}{r^2}$ towards J Boe - Yrij e brightness that ith firefly sees from jeh firefly. In convergence, we will get cluster of fireflies. $X_{i}^{t+1} = X_{i}^{t} + B_{o} e^{-X_{i}^{t}} (X_{i}^{t} - X_{i}^{t}) + \alpha S_{i}^{t}$ Uphace :

moving in the direction of jet · Bo is the brightness level at historice O. scaled by some factor generally set to 1. · y is the light scattering Factor Larger it is The less light (visibility) there is. · rij is the euclidean distance becmeen Xi & Xj. $\sqrt{(2 \times i_{1} - \times i_{1})^{2} + \cdots + (2 \times d_{1} - \times d_{1})^{2}}$ · d is a rankom exploring tendency. • E; t is a rankom velocity. Firefly is good at finding multiple peaks. · nash equilibrium in game theory.